



Lament of Ahmad Khani: 
A Study of the Historical Struggle of the 








The Kurdish poet Sheikmous Hasan, better known as Cigerxwin, 
wrote these words as part of his much larger work, Who Am I? while living 
in exile in Sweden. 
 
“I am the proud Kurd, the enemies’ enemy, the 
friend of peace-loving ones. I am of noble race, not 
wild as they claim. My mighty ancestors were free 
people. Like them I want to be free and that is why 
I fight, for the enemy won’t leave in peace and I 
don’t want to be forever oppressed.”1 
 
Although Hasan, who died in 1984, was a modern voice for Kurdish 
nationalism, he is merely one of a chorus of Kurds reaching back centuries 
crying out for a free and independent Kurdish state, unofficially named 
Kurdistan. 
 Although the concept of nationalism is common today, the cries of the 
Kurds for their own state reach back centuries, the first written example 
coming from the Kurdish poet Ahmad Khani in his national epic Mem-o-Zin 
in 1695. Mem-o-Zin actually predates the French Revolution of 1789, which 
is often thought to be the true beginning of the concept of a national state. 
Despite having conceived of nationalism for the Kurds nearly a century 
ahead of France and the rest of Western Europe, the Kurds lack a state of 
their own. 
 What are the origins of Kurdish nationalist thought and how has it 
evolved over the years? To answer this question, we will track the evolution 
of Kurdish nationalist thought from its origins during the Ottoman Empire, 
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through World War I and up to the present by looking at the three successor 
states of the Ottoman Empire that contain the largest Kurdish populations: 
Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. There have been numerous attempts to create a 
Kurdish state in the past, but they have failed. Why did these attempts fail 
and what challenges exist in the here and now to the creation of an 
independent Kurdish state? Will it be impossible to create a viable Kurdish 
state unless the Kurds have access to the oil fields in Northern Iraq and the 
government in Turkey relieves pressure on its Kurdish minority? Further, 
could a Kurdish state survive without gaining the recognition of groups like 
the UN, the EU, the Arab League, and of individual states such as the United 
States, Russia, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran? 
 
Origins of the Kurds and the Ottoman Empire: 
 Early Kurdish history up to the beginning of the Ottoman Empire is a 
rich tapestry and can easily fill several volumes in and of itself. We will, 
however, focus on several factors that affect Kurdish identity and relations 
to this day. Genealogically, the Kurds can be traced to the Medes who ruled 
over the Persians, or modern day Iranians, circa 613BCE.  The Persians 
eventually conquered the Medians, sowing the historical tension from this 
era that continues to exist to this day.2 
 The Kurds’ location in the Middle East, situated between the Ottoman 
Empire and Persia, afforded them the position buffer zone between the 
powers. Although most Kurdish areas fell under Ottoman control, the Kurds 
gained autonomy by helping fight the Persians and paying tribute in the 
early 1500s. Then, in order to gain further autonomy for their regions under 
Persian control, the central and southern areas, they helped the Persians fight 
the Uzbeks, again in the 1500s.3 This helped to foment the early nationalist 
ideal that we see presented in Khani’s Mem-o-Zin. National heroes such as 
Saladin, whose ethnicity as a Kurd is often ignored and who defeated the 
Crusaders in Jerusalem in 1187, aided in supporting this belief of an 
independent and unified Kurdish people. Yet it is important to point out that 
this principle of ethnicity was only associated with rulers and tribal elite, not 
the common peasant.4 The relative autonomy and the isolation of Kurdish 
nationalist thought would remain the status quo for centuries. 
 In 1804, the expanding Russian Empire made its presence known in 
the Middle East by waging war against the Persians. The result of this war 
was not only the cession of some Kurdish lands to Russia, but the 
introduction of new technologies to the Middle East. Over the next half 
century, the Kurdish leaders watched as their autonomy was stripped away 
by the Ottomans, Persians, and the Russians, who, using modern technology, 
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could better exploit and control the Kurds from great distances.5 The 
Kurdish territories essentially became colonies of these great powers. These 
new colonies were administrated the same way most colonies are: by force. 
 The Ottoman Empire, during the period from 1820 to 1890, often sent 
forces to quell Kurdish uprisings, such as in Amadiya in the 1840s.6 The last 
great rebellion took place in the 1870s led by Sheikh Ubaydullah who united 
the Kurds in Persia and after being exiled, continued to lead the battle 
against the Persian Shah.7 Of all the insurrections that took place during this 
period, the 1839 rebellion led by Prince Muhammad of Rewanduz and the 
1847 rebellion of Bedir Khan Pasha of Botan were the biggest threat and 
required the help of British and Germans to be stopped.8 There are many 
modern day Kurds who see these insurrections as the genesis of a true 
nationalist movement amongst the Kurds. Yet, these rebellions did not take 
place in an intellectual vacuum. 
Ahmad Khani, as mentioned before, produced the first accepted work 
of Kurdish nationalism, but there were other thinkers who fueled the fire as 
well. The Kurdish poet Haji Qadiri Koyi, who died in 1897, argued from 
within the Ottoman Empire not only for the necessity of a Kurdish state, but 
for the use of the sword and the pen to achieve it.9 Koyi’s theory was that 
one of the ways to gain a Kurdish state was through the pen. Prince Medhat 
Beg shared Koyi’s belief. Acting on that belief, Prince Beg published the 
first Kurdish language newspaper, Kurdistan in 1898.10 An interesting side 
note is that the original editor of the newspaper Kurdistan was Miqdad 
Madhad Bedir Khan Pasha, a descendent of the same Bedir Khan Pasha who 
led the 1847 revolt. 
 The Ottoman Empire, like the other Axis Powers, found itself among 
the vanquished powers following World War I. U.S. President Woodrow 
Wilson was a champion of the idea of “Self Determination” for all 
nationalities living within the borders of the now defunct empires.11 By the 
end of World War I in 1918, many politicians and academics like Wilson 
were arguing that one of the reasons for World War I was the multi-national 
nature of the defeated empires of the Germans, Ottomans, and Austro-
Hungarians. They believed that the only way to prevent another war was to 
give all nationalities their own states. Seizing the opportunity, Kurdish 
General Sherif Pasha from the Ottoman Empire traveled to the Versailles 
Peace Conference in 1919 to push for the independence of the Kurdish 
people.12 Much to the relief of Pasha and the Kurdish people, both his calls 
and those of Wilson were heard. 
The Treaty of Sevres signed on August 10, 1920, by the victorious 
powers of World War I and the Ottoman Empire, recognized the right for a 
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Kurdish state, Kurdistan, in Section III of the treaty. The boundaries of 
Kurdistan outlined in Article 62 are,  
“…for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east 
of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary 
of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and 
north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and 
Mesopotamia…”13 
The size of Kurdistan could be increased in 1922 if the large Kurdish 
population in what would become Iraq voted to join their compatriots to the 
north. 
With the signing of the Treaty of Serves, it appeared that the Kurds 
had finally achieved that for which Ahmad Khani had argued: an 
independent Kurdish state. Little did they realize that their hopes would soon 
be dashed. 
 
Turkey and the Kurds: 
 The large area in eastern Turkey that was promised to the Kurds by 
the Treaty of Sevres was an area that was once held jointly by both Kurds 
and Armenians. During the period of 1915 and 1921, however, many 
Armenians were either forced from the land or executed in what many agree 
was an attempt at genocide by the Ottoman Empire.14 The Kurds, some of 
who helped in this genocide, were now in the majority in the region. As a 
result of the Treaty of Sevres and the leaders of the defeated Ottoman 
Empire, it appeared that the Kurds would finally have their state, but they 
weren’t the only peoples experiencing a rebirth of nationalism. 
 Following World War I, a Turkish nationalist movement swept 
through what is now Turkey. This movement was a direct reaction to 
territorial losses Turkey suffered at the hands of the Treaty of Sevres. 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha, leader of the National Party, established an 
opposition government to the Sultan’s, which had signed the treaty. He 
fought a guerilla war against the Allied forces of Greece, Britain, France, 
and Italy from 1921 until 1922, effectively routing their forces in Turkey. 
His success against the Greeks led to the withdrawal of French and Italian 
Allied forces in Southern Anatolia. With Mustafa Kemal Pasha now in 
control of Turkey, he forced a new peace conference with the Allies that led 
to the Treaty of Lausanne, which was signed on July 24, 1923.15 These 
events changed the course of Kurdish independence. 
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 Mustafa Kemal Pasha, later to be known as Ataturk or “Father of the 
Turks,” after 1934, came to power fighting the idea of a division of Turkey 
itself. His idea was to create a modern secular state, and he needed all of 
Turkey to accomplish it. Independence of the Kurds in eastern Turkey was 
simply unacceptable because of the additional territorial loss to the already 
diminished territory of the Turks. Ataturk believed that since the government 
that had signed the Treaty of Sevres was no longer in power, neither he nor 
Turkey had to abide by it. Normally, this would have caused greater outrage 
amongst the Allies than it did, yet there is one major reason that such a 
reaction was not provoked. 
 Many scholars place the dismal fate of the Kurds on the British. While 
the Treaty of Lausanne was being debated, the British seized the central area 
of what would have been Kurdistan after discovering oil. Had there been an 
independent Kurdish state to the north of Iraq, it would have endangered 
British holdings.16 Thus, when the Treaty of Lausanne made no mention of 
the Kurds or any other minority by name, they simply turned the other way. 
As a nod to the previous Treaty of Sevres, however, the European powers 
made mention of minority rights in the Treaty of Lausanne, but they were 
blatantly ignored by Turkey.17 The Treaty of Lausanne, however, allowed 
the Turks to carry out their plans to create a unified and homogenous 
country. 
 The first in a long history of oppressive actions of the Turks against 
the Kurds began with a March 3, 1924 decree that banned all Kurdish 
schools, organizations, and publications, as well as all religious seminaries 
and fraternities.18 This was a first attempt by the Turks to assimilate the 
Kurds. Additionally, from 1925 to 1928, there were mass deportations and 
resettlements of over 500,000 Kurds to locations outside of Kurdistan.19 
Overall, the Turks believed if they wiped out the means to spread Kurdish 
culture and spread the Kurds throughout Turkey, they would wipe out the 
Kurds as well. 
 The worst incident of Kurdish repression took place in Dersim on the 
heels of a Kurdish rebellion between 1936 and 1939. Using the uprising as 
an excuse, the Turks attempted to obliterate all Kurdish opposition and 
culture.20 All villages that had taken part in the insurrection were razed to the 
ground, and the region was renamed Tunceli. The word Kurd vanished from 
the Turkish language, and the Kurds became “Mountain Turks.”21 Finally, 
the region was closed to foreigners until 1965. During this period from 1939 
to 1965, the idea of Kurdish nationalism appeared to vanish in Turkey due to 
state suppression. It was not be until the 1960s that it returned. 
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 In the early 1960s the world was awash in Leftist revolutions and 
Rightist responses, and Turkey was not immune. Although the Kurds no 
longer technically existed, they still used their language and practiced their 
traditions. As a result, Colonel Turkes, one of the leaders of the 1960 
Rightist coup, threatened to wipe out the Kurds like they did the Armenians 
in 1915.22 In 1961, however, a new constitution was passed, replacing the 
strict military rule that had viewed the Kurds as a major threat. The new 
government allowed the Kurdish population a form of indirect 
representation.23 This newfound freedom allowed for the rise of new 
political parties, thinkers, and leaders within the Turkish Kurd populations. 
 Although the 1961 constitution ended the military coup rule, it was 
not the last time the military would intervene. Since 1961, there have been 
three additional instances of the military coups taking place in 1971, 1980, 
1997. Generally, the coups took place simply because the military did not 
like the leaders in power or felt that the country was headed in the wrong 
direction. The 1980 coup, however, occurred in part because of fear of a 
Kurdish resurgence, fueled by the founding of the Kurdish Workers’ Party 
(PKK) in 1978.24 
 The 1990s have led to numerous clashes between the Kurds and the 
Turks. The bulk of these challenges deal with the PKK and the Kurdish 
region in northern Iraq. Additionally, Turkey, which is now in talks to join 
the European Union, must not only acknowledge its past abuses of the 
Kurds, but it must now work hard to integrate them while giving them 
cultural freedom. This is contrary to how the Turkish government has 
traditionally reacted to the Kurds. 
 When one studies the leaders of Kurdish nationalism in the last 
century, it is important to understand two things. First, borders of the states 
created from the Ottoman Empire were created by the Europeans, not the 
existing national groups. And second, because of these artificial borders, the 
nationalist movements are not isolated to a single country, but extend their 
influence to the other countries in which Kurds are present. Therefore, I 
have had to create somewhat artificial boundaries for some of these leaders 
and thinkers. When studying the Kurdish nationalists, I will divide them up 
along the lines of what country they affected the most with their ideas or 
what countries in which they spent the bulk of their time. 
 The first Kurdish nationalist effort following the Treaty of Sevres was 
the Committee for Kurdish Independence founded in 1922.25 The founders 
of the Committee were Yusuf Ziya Bey and Colonel Halit Bey. Their push 
for an independent Kurdish state was cut short, however, with the March 3, 
1924 decree which effectively banned them. The two men were arrested on 
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October 10 and December 20, respectively, and executed in late March, 
1925. Their execution most likely went hand in hand with the uprising of 
Sheikh Sa’id in March 1925. 
 Sheikh Sa’id was a chief of the Sunni Naqshbandi Sufi order that 
started a Kurdish uprising in March of 1925. Although initially successful, it 
was limited, like most early Kurdish movements, by tribal rivalry. Many 
argue that although the bulk of the people in the uprising were Kurds, the 
movement was against the modernization and secularization of Ataturk.26 
 Perhaps the biggest threat to Ataturk was the Khoyboun, the first 
known Kurdish political party. Founded in Paris in 1918 by aristocrats and 
intellectuals, the Khoyboun created a government in exile in 1927 and 
started a two year rebellion in 1928. Led by Ihsan Nuri Pasha, the Khoyboun 
movement centered around seeking an end to Kurdish tribal rivalry and the 
creation of a single independent state with secular inclinations.27 
 Following the repression by the Turkish government, the Kurds had to 
wait until the 1960s to create a new political party. Yet, the next major 
thinker and political figure to arise would not appear until 1974 when the 
PKK was formed by Adullah Ocalan. Ocalan’s PKK was founded as a 
Marxist-Leninist party. Ocalan designed it not only to fight for a Kurdish 
state, but for freedom from class distinction, feudalism, and colonialism.28 
Some would argue that recent military crack downs by the Turkish 
government are directly connected to the PKK and their actions in Turkish 
Kurdistan. 
 As previously mentioned, the 1980 military coup was in part, a 
response to the PKK. Since the PKK returned to Turkey in 1983, they have 
engaged in sporadic combat with Turkey’s military and police as well as 
kidnappings of local officials and collaborators. After the 1991 Gulf War, 
the PKK started to use the lawless borderlands with Iraq to avoid the Turks, 
leading to Turkish incursions into northern Iraq.29 
 Turkey has long oppressed the Kurdish people, but one could argue 
that, at least initially, it was because the Turks themselves were emerging 
from a form of colonialism imposed by the Allies after World War I. As the 
Turks worked to unify their people, the act of pushing out the Greek, French, 
and Italian troops helped to cement the Turkish identity. The Kurds, once 
again facing the reality of being a colonized people, were united in their own 
nationalism as they fought a force that attempted to wipe out their cultural 
identity. 
 Now the tables have turned on Turkey. Turkey must admit to its past 
wrong doings and attempt to give the Kurds at least a measure of 
understanding if it wishes to join the European Union. In order to do this, 
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Turkey must demonstrate full compliance with the European Commission of 
Human Rights, which in turn protects the Kurdish minority. What this means 
for the future of the Kurds of Turkey remains to be seen, but one thing is for 
certain. Whatever happens, it is sure to reach beyond Turkey and affect 
another state with a large Kurdish minority, Iran. 
 
The Kurds in Iran: 
 The situation of the Kurds in Iran is one that can be called in some 
ways poetically just. As previously mentioned in the brief overview of 
ancient Kurdish history, the ancestors of today’s Kurds ruled over the 
ancestors of today’s Iranians. Although not as widely broadcast in the media 
as the Kurds in Iraq or Turkey, the Kurds in Iran have historically come the 
closest to regaining that which was promised in the Treaty of Sevres. 
Perhaps the reason for their partial success has been their relatively isolated 
location in northwestern Iran, or perhaps it has been from outside help. 
Whatever the reason, the Kurds were able to do something in Iran that they 
were never able to do anywhere else in the Middle East: declare the creation 
of an independent Kurdish Republic. 
 Unlike many of the modern day nations in the Middle East with 
Kurdish populations, Iran was not created out of the territorial remains of the 
Ottoman Empire. Territorially, the borders of modern Iran roughly 
correspond to those of the ancient Persian Empire, though it was unofficially 
carved into Soviet and British spheres of influence. Yet nestled in the 
northwest of Iran is the predominantly Kurdish region that would have 
become eastern Kurdistan according to the Treaty of Sevres.30 
 During World War I, the government of Iran had very little control 
over events happening within its own borders. Kurdish tribal leaders took 
advantage of this by increasing their own power through confederations 
between tribes and raiding rivals and non-ethnic Kurds.31 We also see, 
because of a weak central government, that the shah was only able to 
maintain control in the cities, but not in the countryside where rebellions 
tend to start. 
 We would expect at this point for some sort of coherent nationalist 
thought to appear. The strongest leader to emerge at this time was a semi-
nationalist Kurdish chief named Isma’il Agha Simko. An affluent tribal 
chief, Simko established an independent Kurdish government in western 
Iran, south of Lake Urumiyeh in 1918. Although his power was actually 
based upon tribal loyalty, Simko himself appeared to display nationalist 
leanings. During his reign he published a journal called Independent 
Kurdistan, dedicated to Kurdish self-determination, and worked to create a 
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Kurdish state. He received support from Kurds in both Turkey and Iraq. The 
truth, however, is that Simko lacked a true message and fought more for 
power for his tribe and for himself rather than for nationalism, though many 
of those fighting, especially from Turkey and Iraq, more than likely fought 
for a nationalist ideal.32 For a while it looked as if Simko might succeed in 
creating his own Kurdish state, but that would soon all change. 
 In 1921, while Mustafa Kemal Pasha was fighting against Allied 
forces in Turkey, a military officer named Reza Khan, later to become Reza 
Shah Pahlavi in 1925,  deposed the then sitting shah of Iran in a military 
coup.33 Reza Khan moved quickly to consolidate his power. One of the 
moves he made was creating a modern army, which he then used to rout 
Simko’s forces in 1922, putting an end to the rebellion, a task that the 
previous shah and his forces had been unable to accomplish. Another 
attempt to consolidate power was Reza Khan’s policy of land registration in 
1926, which worked to weaken tribal leaders and to force tribes to settle in 
permanent communities. The result for the Kurds was a radical change in 
lifestyle. Most Kurds had been migrant herders up to this point, and the land 
reform led to the emergence of two separate Kurdish classes: the poor farm 
laborers and rich land owners.34 This and other tough policies by Reza Shah 
led to the emergence of true nationalism and intellectualism among Iranian 
Kurds. 
 With the Allied invasion in 1940 and the subsequent replacement of 
the Axis-sympathetic Reza Shah by his Allied favored son Mohammed Reza 
Shah in 1941, Iran came to know the harsh reality of World War II.35 
Kurdish unity across all borders finally became official in 1944 with 
representatives from Iran, Iraq, and Turkey meeting at Mount Dalanpar. 
Then, less than a year later, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) was 
formed in Iran and led by Qazi Mohammad.36 
 Mohammad was the leader of the KDP and the son of a powerful 
Iranian Kurdish family. After assuming the leadership of the KDP, he was 
faced with the familiar problem of bringing together both the urban Kurds 
and the conservative tribal chiefs. A fierce Kurdish nationalist, Qazi 
Mohammad urged his people to stick together, not to trust the Persians, and 
not to stand in the way of any Kurd who could lead the Kurdish people.37 
 The Kurdish leaders in Iran, such as Qazi Muhammad, decided to 
seize upon the weakened state of the shah, much like Simko had, and 
declared the creation of an independent Kurdish state on December 15, 
1945. This state, commonly known as the Mahabad Republic, elected Qazi 
Muhammad as its first and only president.38 The Mahabad Republic 
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represented a beacon of hope for Kurdish nationalism. Unfortunately, for the 
Kurds of the Mahabad Republic, that beacon would soon be snuffed out. 
 The Mahabad Republic existed as the result of Soviet forces in Iran. 
The Soviets, in an attempt to destabilize Iran, had also set up an Azerbaijani 
republic right next to Mahabad. Additionally, it is widely believed that the 
Soviet Union actually planned on annexing both of the republics once Iran 
gave up on them.39 Yet there were additional problems to the Mahabad 
Republic. Due to its abrupt creation, Mahabad was backward in the 
economic, social, cultural, and political realms.40 Another problem was the 
socialist beliefs of the KDP, which were in opposition to many of the 
conservative tribes. To bolster his position, Qazi Mohammad turned to Iraqi 
Kurdish fighters, known as pershmerga, leader Mustafa Barzani, whom we 
will discuss when we talk about Iraq. Although their ideologies differed, 
Barzani hoped that by helping in Iran, he could help his cause back home.41 
 By the fall of 1946, things looked bleak for the Mahabad Republic. 
Soviet forces had withdrawn, as had Barzani. Iranian forces occupied 
Mahabad on December 14, 1946. On March 31, 1947, Qazi Mohammad and 
his fellow leaders were publicly executed by hanging in the attempt to snuff 
out the independence hopes of Kurds.42 The decades following the fall of the 
Mahabad Republic offered glimmers of hope coupled with disaster. 
 When Mohammed Mossadegh gained power in Iran in 1951, the KDP 
began lobbying for independence, but all efforts to this end were suspended 
with the 1953 coup that ousted Mossadegh. The Shah in turn began to 
fiercely crack down on the Kurds by banning their political parties and 
limiting what they could broadcast on the radio. This was followed by 
another minor Kurdish revolution in 1967, which was quickly quelled.43 
 The Islamic Revolution in 1979 offered new hope for the Kurds. 
Having helped to overthrow the Shah, the Kurds believed Ayatollah 
Khomeini would grant autonomy for their people. Khomeini, however, 
rejected the request on the grounds that Kurdish autonomy would go against 
the ideal of a unified Islamic community. Khomeini also claimed that the 
Islamic Revolution was as nationalist as it was religious and Kurdish 
autonomy would disturb that as well.44 
 During the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988, the Iranian Kurds 
received arms from Iraq and Turkey to fight against the forces of Khomeini 
so they could gain their freedom. Until the war began, Khomeini had 
intended to deal with his Kurdish problem by force, but his plans were 
placed on hold until 1982. Then, in 1984, a massive Iranian offensive 
devastated the Kurdish region ending all viable resistance.45 Little data about 
the Kurds in Iran following the Iran-Iraq war has become public, but what 
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few documents have trickled out seem to indicate additional instances of 
minor uprisings and terrorism followed by repression. 
 There exist two major Kurdish political parties in Iran. The first party 
is the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, also known as the Kurdish 
Democratic Party or the Kurdish Democratic Party in Iran. The reason for 
the addition of the “in Iran” to the KDP was because when Barzani returned 
to Iraq, he used the name KDP to consolidate his power.46 The KDP in Iran, 
however, has very little in common with its sister party. The KDP in Iran is 
basically an urban and elitist group, with moderate tribal connections.47 Its 
stated goals are the creation of a socialist democratic society, the right of 
peoples of Iran to self-determination, gender equality, and separation of 
religion and state.48 
 The other party is Komala. Komala was the original name of the KDP. 
After the formation of the KDP in Iran, it vanished until the fall of 1969. The 
new Komala is strongly Marxist-Leninist.49. The party fights for democratic 
freedoms, civil rights, and women’s rights. In the summer of 2000, the party 
split into two groups, Komala and the significantly weaker Revolutionary 
Organization of People of Kurdistan.50 
 Unfortunately for the Kurds, their attempts to create a sustained 
Kurdish state have been thwarted mainly because the Kurds are trying to 
break off a piece of their colonizers’ country, rather than one of its colonial 
territories. Iran has helped light the nationalist fire, but it is no longer the 
most likely place for the birth of an independent Kurdistan. For that, we 
must turn to what would have been the center of the original Kurdistan 
promised in the Treaty of Sevres, what is now northern Iraq. 
 
Iraq and Hope?: 
 The Kurdish population in Iraq is perhaps the most well known in the 
world. Populating primarily northeastern Iraq, the Kurds of this region 
occupy what was to have been central Kurdistan, according to the Treaty of 
Sevres. The main reason these particular Kurds have become well known is 
because of the part they’ve played in every war Iraq has taken part in during 
the last quarter century. Truth be told, however, the particular plight of these 
Kurds goes back to the very founding of Iraq. This Kurdish population has 
been the center of repression for numerous reasons, including the one reason 
why a Kurdish state may actually be viable: oil. 
 Northeastern Iraq is territory that, according to the Treaty of Sevres, 
possessed the option of voting to become part of Kurdistan in 1922 had it 
not been for the Turkish nationalist uprising. With the loss of Kurdistan in 
eastern Turkey, the British did not see the point in letting the Kurds vote to 
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join a nonexistent entity, so they incorporated them into their sphere of 
influence along with Iraq, though the actual fate of the Kurdish territory 
would not be resolved until 1926.51 
 From the very beginning, the British faced complications with the 
Kurdish region. In 1918, the British appointed Sheikh Mahmud, a member 
of an illustrious Sufi house to subdue and supervise the Kurds for the new 
British mandate for Iraq. Sheikh Mahmud, however, quickly turned on the 
British.52 Constant unrest in the area, partially because of the separatist aims 
of Sheikh Mahmud, was initially quelled by the British Royal Air Force in 
the winter of 1919-1920.53 This gave the Kurds the dubious honor of being 
the first civilian targets of aerial bombardment. The British eventually 
captured Sheikh Mahmud and exiled him to India. 
 Sheikh Mahmud returned to Sulaymania in 1922 to head a “Free 
Kurdistan Movement,” which declared independence for Iraqi Kurdistan 
with him as king. The problem with Mahmud, however, was that he 
represented the old order of tribal chiefs. Although there is evidence that 
four out of five Iraqi Kurds supported Sheikh Mahmud’s calls for an 
independent Kurdistan, the more modern Kurds living in the south blamed 
people like him and his traditional values for the Kurds present suffering. On 
the other side, conservative tribal chiefs saw little difference in surrendering 
their power to either him or the British. Eventually, the vast majority of 
Sheikh Mahmud’s support dissolved when the Turks invaded in 1924.54 
Sheikh Mahmud continued fighting, leading several more minor 
insurrections, before dying in 1931. 
 The dispute over the territory of Iraqi Kurdistan was finally settled by 
the League of Nations in 1926. Citing the cruel treatment of the Kurds by the 
Turks, the territory was officially incorporated into northeastern Iraq. The 
League also insisted that Iraq give the Kurdish regions cultural and social 
autonomy.55 These rights were ignored when Iraq was finally given 
independence in 1932.56 
 Mustafa Barzani became the major force in Kurdish politics. Barzani, 
as we have already seen, helped protect the Mahabad Republic in Iran during 
its brief existence in 1945. Prior to his work in Iran, Barzani had led a two 
year revolt in Iraq. After the collapse of the Mahabad Republic, Barzani fled 
to the Soviet Union. Following a revolution in Baghdad in 1958, Mustafa 
Barzani returned home to help fight alongside the new government that 
declared the Kurds partners.57 This declaration of partnership is not 
surprising in and of itself because the leader of the military forces that had 




 The solidarity the Kurds and Arabs in Iraq had agreed to quickly 
dissipated when, in 1961, a Kurdish rebellion broke out. The Kurds had 
decided once again to move beyond autonomy in Iraq and push for full 
blown independence. Then, in 1963, Barzani and his forces declared the 
creation of a Kurdish liberation zone in northeastern Iraq.59 Two more coups 
occurred in Iraq during the 1960s. 
 Ultimately it would be the Ba’ath party that gained control of Iraq in 
1968. The Ba’ath party, based on the ideology of Michel Aflaq, promoted 
the concept of Arab nationalism. Although Aflaq knew such a concept 
frightened minorities like the Kurds and himself, he felt that the Kurds could 
be integrated into a new Iraq just the same as any minority group in Arab 
territory.60 On March 11, 1970, then Ba’ath party member Saddam Hussein 
entered into negotiations with Barzani and his KDP. The agreement called 
for Kurdish to be the second national language and a Kurdish autonomous 
region to be established in the north.61 
 The treaty turned out to be a ruse. Less than a year after signing the 
agreement, there was an attempt on Barzani’s life, which was initially 
blamed on the leader of the Kurdish opposition party led by Jalal Talabani. 
In 1974, after the Kurdish autonomous region was created, the laws 
governing it turned out to be vastly different than those promised in the 
March 1970 agreement. Using the creation of the autonomous region as an 
excuse, Barzani, with aid from the Shah of Iran, launched another rebellion 
against the Ba’ath party, only to be sold out by his ally in 1975 with the 
signing of the Algiers Accord between Iraq and Iran. Barzani went into exile 
in Tehran and died in 1978.62 
 Arguably, at this point the Kurds in Iraq lost their greatest nationalist. 
Barzani had the most influence and led the most successful fight thus far for 
a Kurdish state. Things were about to get worse, however, with the coming 
of the Iraq-Iran War starting in 1980. 
 Initially, the Iraqis were making impressive strides in the Iraq-Iran 
war, partially because of confusion that followed the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran in 1979. The Kurds in Iraq, however, openly supported Iran, especially 
since most of the funding for the KDP came from Tehran. This damaged the 
already poor image of the Kurds with many Arab Iraqis but it did not 
become a major issue until the Iranians began to turn the tide of the war. 
Desperate, Saddam Hussein, now leader of the Ba’ath party, sought to spite 
the Kurds of the KDP by striking a deal with the other major Kurdish party 
in 1984, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The deal was quashed, 
however, when Turkey, whose oil pipelines Iraq needed for exports, 
objected with fears that the Kurds would have too much autonomy.63 Yet, 
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despite the casualties the Kurds faced in the Iraq-Iran War, one of the worst 
episodes in Kurdish history was still to be written. 
 Beginning in 1987, Hussein initiated what was known as the Anfal 
campaign. Anfal roughly translates to “unbeliever” in the Koran. As such, 
the campaign consisted of eight distinctive offensives occurring in six 
predominantly Kurdish areas. It included the destruction of thousands of 
villages, executions, and the use of chemical weapons. What is important to 
note, however, is that the Anfal was not a reaction to Kurdish support for 
Iran in the war; it merely gave Hussein an excuse. The campaign itself was 
thought out years in advance of the Iraq-Iran War and used modern tactics 
and equipment.64 The number of Kurds killed in the campaign is estimated 
by Middle East Watch as between 50,000 and 100,000; Kurds claim it to be 
as high as 182,000. Ali Hasan al-Majid, leader of Anfal operations, claims 
the number is no more than 100,000.65 It was the Anfal that helped galvanize 
the Kurds to make their next move toward independence. 
 The forces of Iraq were severely diminished in the Persian Gulf War 
that began in 1990 and ended in 1991. Kurds and Shiites, both encouraged 
by the words of U.S. President George H.W. Bush, rose up against Hussein 
believing they would get support from the U.S. The Kurdish uprising began 
in March 1991. The Iraqi forces, after crushing the more serious Shiite 
uprising in the south, turned north, leading to a mass exodus of Kurds into 
the surrounding states to escape retaliations from the Iraqi forces.66 
In retaliation to Hussein’s crushing of the rebellions both in the north 
and south, the UN passed a resolution allowing the Allies, mainly the U.S. 
and Britain, to set up no-fly zones. Ironically, the Northern No-Fly Zone, 
which was meant for the Kurds, left out roughly two thirds of Iraqi 
Kurdistan.67 In May 1992 a Regional Administration was established in Irbil 
with the help of the UN and U.S., making the region into a proto-state. 
Immediately, the unity of the Kurds began to break apart, and fighting 
between the PUK and the KDP erupted in 1994, with relative unity returning 
in 1996 with an invasion from Hussein’s forces.68 
The government of Saddam Hussein was overthrown in 2003 by a 
coalition led primarily by U.S. and British forces. On April 10, 2003, the 
Kurds aided the U.S. in the assault on Kirkuk, Iraq’s fourth largest city and 
the controlling center of the Kirkuk oil fields.69 During the 2004 elections 
for the Iraqi transitional government, the Kurds of Kirkuk had hoped for a 
low turnout in the election so they could bolster their chances of gaining 
greater influence in the new government.70 Since that time, the Kurds have 
worked hard with the Shiites and Sunnis to help create a new constitution 
from which to help rule Iraq.71 The constitution, which was passed on 
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October 25, 2005, grants the Kurds, as well as the Shiites and Sunni, a large 
degree of autonomy, though it states that Iraq is one state with many 
nationalities. This autonomy, which the Kurds have essentially maintained 
since 1992 because of the no-fly zone, includes such rights as taxation and 
manning a police force. Additionally, Iraqi Kurdistan has been allowed to 
keep all rights and laws it has possessed since 1992 unless it contradicts the 
new Iraqi Constitution.72 The current president of Iraq is Jalal Talabani, the 
leader of the PUK. 
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan was started in 1976 by Talabani as 
an offshoot of the Kurdish Democratic Party. In order to compete with the 
stronger KDP, the PUK expanded its base to include almost every ideology 
possible. It has conservative, center, and Marxist factions. The PUK has 
often negotiated with the government in Baghdad, though it was never 
successful, and has come into armed conflict with the KDP several times as 
well.73 Since the fall of Hussein, the PUK has pushed forward on a platform 
for “…the right of self-determination for the Kurdish people within a unified 
democratic Iraq.”74 
The main opposition of the PUK is the KDP. The KDP in Iraq was 
created by Ibrahim Ahmad at the urging of Barzani while he was in Iran. 
Ahmad controlled the party until he was ousted by Barzani in a 1964 internal 
coup. The KDP is mainly urban elitist, though its military power actually 
comes from northern Iraqi Kurdistan. Since the death of Mustafa Barzani, 
the line of control was passed to Barzani’s eldest son, Idris, and then to 
Masoud in 1987, who has headed the party ever since.75  The KDP seeks to 
“…achieve all basic human and national rights… and to support all 
democratic principles for all ethnic, and other, oppressed peoples.”76 Pushing 
hard for an independent Kurdish state, Masoud Barzani, president of Iraqi 
Kurdistan, stated on November 18, 2005 with regard to the present 
insurgency in Iraq, “May God save us from civil war, but if others start 
fighting among themselves and there is an outbreak, we will have no other 
alternative (but to proclaim independence).”77 
Iraqi Kurdistan is presently the strongest candidate for an independent 
Kurdish state. It is, however, part of Iraq and seems intent on staying there, 
at least on paper. Yet the words of leaders like Masoud Barzani indicate that 
it might be headed toward independence, especially considering it has been a 
proto-state for more than a decade. Additionally, Iraqi Kurdistan has been 
described by many visitors as a thriving region of Iraq and relatively secure. 
So the question remains, especially with the recent statement of Barzani, will 
Iraqi Kurdistan declare independence, and if it does, what will a Kurdish 




Kurdistan in the Future?: 
The main problem with questioning what a Kurdish state might look 
like is that the answer is dependent entirely upon asking, “From what 
country will an independent Kurdistan emerge?” Presently, Iraqi Kurdistan 
looks to be the most promising prospect for an independent Kurdistan. If that 
were the case, then Kurdistan would be a democratic state blessed with a 
growing economy driven, in large part, by oil revenues and agriculture. But 
this would be true only if Kurdistan includes Kirkuk, which, now that Kurds 
are returning there in mass, would be almost a given. The autonomy they 
experienced since 1992, assisted by help received from the UN, has helped 
create a profitable region with great potential for growth. 
Kurdistan may possibly emerge in either Turkey or Iran. Present 
conditions in both countries, however, make such a split look extremely 
improbable. Both governments are strong and very unlikely to allow for any 
more than an autonomous zone, though once again that sort of event is also 
unlikely due to the possibility of it sparking a violent push for Kurdish 
independence. Kurds are also found in numerous other countries, including 
Syria and Armenia, but their numbers are much smaller, as are their 
territorial possessions. Theoretically, if a Kurdish state were created, either 
from one of the three covered states or even all of them, what problems 
would an independent Kurdistan face? 
Numerous problems abound with the possibility of a Kurdish state, 
including whether the state can even be viable. Assuming that the three 
largest Kurdish regions, those found in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, did declare 
themselves independent and unified, it would most likely lead to a massive 
uproar in the region. Already with the de facto autonomy in Iraqi Kurdistan, 
Turkey has issued statements to Iraq about its worries that a free Iraqi 
Kurdistan might lead to rebellions in their Kurdish region.78 No doubt there 
would be a similar reaction in Iran, or even Iraq, if there were an attempt at 
secession. If the European powers fought tooth and nail against those they 
colonized who were fighting for nationalist freedom, why would Turkey, 
Iran, or Iraq be any different? 
If Kurdistan were to have any chance of survival from an invasion, it 
would need the immediate backing of the UN, the European Union, the Arab 
League, the U.S., and Russia. The UN already has programs in many of the 
Kurdish areas that help the poor there and is helping to improve 
infrastructure. The European Union and the U.S. both have strong ties with 
Turkey, especially the European Union now that it entered into negotiations 
with Turkey regarding membership and has begun applying pressure 
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regarding the treatment of Turkish Kurd populations. Russian recognition 
would be required because Russia has closer ties to Iran than any of the 
other mentioned groups. Russian recognition could possibly dissuade Iranian 
aggression aimed at regaining lost territory. 
The U.S. and its presence in Iraq might also make it easier to prevent 
armed retaliation against a seceding Kurdistan, though the U.S. and its allies 
want to keep Iraq whole. The KDP and the PUK have both stated that they 
wouldn’t declare independence unless there was a civil war. If that were the 
case, the U.S. would have its hands full, if it were still present in Iraq at all. 
Another group that might be able to help with Iraq would be the Arab 
League. The Arab League might be able to help restrain any sort of Iraqi 
reaction. There are other problems, however, beside invasion that Kurdistan 
might have to face. 
Kurdistan’s viability is perhaps the question of paramount importance. 
Once again, let us assume that an independent Kurdistan will consist of the 
Kurdish territories from Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. Geographically, Kurdistan 
would be in a poor location. Much of the land they inhabit is rugged and 
mountainous, yet it is the mountains that have sustained the Kurds as a 
people. Unfortunately, rugged mountains make for very difficult farming. A 
fledgling Kurdistan would require an influx of revenue separate from the 
charity it presently receives from the UN and other international 
organizations in order to improve its economy. This income could only 
currently be acquired with the inclusion of Iraqi Kurdistan and its oil. The 
oil, an economic god send, poses new problems to Kurdistan. 
Kurdistan itself would be a landlocked state without any way to 
transport the afore-mentioned oil to the international market. Ideally, 
Kurdistan would simply use existing pipelines through Iraq and pay the 
government a fee, but if things in Kurdistan don’t change, the Kurdish 
parties have stated they won’t declare independence unless a civil war 
breaks out. A civil war would preclude the use of existing pipelines. The 
Kurds could build pipelines through Turkey, but considering the animosity 
between the Kurds and Turks, such a prospect looks even bleaker. Bad blood 
would not only exist between the states, but between the minorities in said 
states. 
The Kurds are not the only people living in these so-called Kurdish 
territories, they are simply the majority there. Numerous ethnic groups, 
ranging from Turks and Arabs to Persians inhabit these lands as well. 
Although many would likely leave, for fear of reprisals, others would stay 
and fight. In the city of Kirkuk during the elections in 2004 for the 
transitional government, Omar Khattab, manager of the local National 
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Turkmen Movement office, said, “We are ready for anything…civil war has 
to come. The Kurds are four million, and we are three million. Our young 
men are ready to defend us.”79 If Kurds in all three countries declare 
independence, they will not only have to fight with the minorities in their 
new state, but will most likely wind up fighting each other. 
As previously mentioned, following the establishment of the no-fly 
zone in northern Iraq in 1992, the KDP and PUK started fighting each other. 
Although they seem to have worked out their differences for the time being, 
imagine what would happen when the Kurdish parties in all three countries 
try to unite and share power. The divergent views of these parties are so 
great that the possibility of a civil war is almost guaranteed. The Kurds, 
despite their cries for unity, are isolated in their causes because they are 
fighting three different enemies, and each group of Kurds has had to adjust 
their tactics and ideologies accordingly. 
From its inception, a modern day, independent Kurdistan composed of 
the Kurdish regions from Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, would be a nearly destitute 
state under constant threat of attack from its neighbors and from within. 
Geographically isolated, it would be hard pressed to export any of its goods 
in order to improve its economic status. Unless there are some radical 
changes in the states surrounding what would be Kurdistan, and the Kurdish 
parties develop a coherent ideology across state lines, the dreams of Ahmad 
Khani and so many others will go unfulfilled.  
                                                 
1  Osman, Sipan.  “Kurdish Poems.”  Sipan’s Website  1 Nov. 2005.  1 Nov. 2005  < 
http://sipan50.tripod.com/id5.html.> 
2  Nisan, Mordechai.  Minorities in the Middle East  (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc.  2002),  
33. 
3  Ibid.,  34-36. 
4  Kreyenbroek, Philip G. and Stefan Sperl.  The Kurds  (New York: Routledge.  1992),  49. 
5  Izady, Mehrdad.  The Kurds  (Bristol: Taylor & Francis, Inc.  1992),  55-57. 
6  Nisan, Mordechai.  Minorities in the Middle East  (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc.  2002),  
36. 
7  Ciment, James.  The Kurds  (New York: Facts on File, Inc.  1996),  41. 
8  Allison, Christine and Philip Kreyenbroek.  Kurdish Culture and Identity  (Atlantic Highlands: 
Zed Books Ltd,  1996),  13. 
9  Allison, Christine and Philip Kreyenbroek.  Kurdish Culture and Identity  (Atlantic Highlands: 
Zed Books Ltd,  1996),  49. 
10  Izady, Mehrdad.  The Kurds  (Bristol: Taylor & Francis, Inc.  1992),  181. 
11  Ibid.,  59. 
12  Nisan, Mordechai.  Minorities in the Middle East  (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc.  2002),  
37. 
13  Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923  Vol. 2.  (New 
York: Carnegie,  1924),  Treaty of Sevres. 
14  Campbell, Colm, Kirsten E. Schulze, and Martin Stokes.  Nationalism, Minorities and Diasporas: 
Identities and Right in the Middle East  (New York: Tauris Academic Studies,  1996),  25. 
15  Bram, Leon L.  “Turkey.”  Funk & Wagnalls New Encyclopedia.  New York City:  Funk & 
Wagnalls, Inc.  1975. 
  
19
                                                                                                                                                 
16  Izady, Mehrdad.  The Kurds  (Bristol: Taylor & Francis, Inc.  1992),  60-61. 
17  Ibid.,  60-61. 
18  Ibid.,  61. 
19  Nisan, Mordechai.  Minorities in the Middle East  (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc.  2002),  
39. 
20  Campbell, Colm, Kirsten E. Schulze, and Martin Stokes.  Nationalism, Minorities and Diasporas: 
Identities and Right in the Middle East  (New York: Tauris Academic Studies,  1996),  26. 
21  Kreyenbroek, Philip G. and Stefan Sperl.  The Kurds  (New York: Routledge.  1992),  73. 
22  Ibid.,  103-104. 
23  Campbell, Colm, Kirsten E. Schulze, and Martin Stokes.  Nationalism, Minorities and Diasporas: 
Identities and Right in the Middle East  (New York: Tauris Academic Studies,  1996),  26. 
24  Ibid.,  26. 
25  Nisan, Mordechai.  Minorities in the Middle East  (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc.  2002),  
39. 
26  Izady, Mehrdad.  The Kurds  (Bristol: Taylor & Francis, Inc.  1992),  61-62. 
27  Ibid.,  62. 
28  Ibid.,  215-216. 
29  Ibid.,  216-217. 
30  Ciment, James.  The Kurds  (New York: Facts on File, Inc.  1996),  120. 
31  Kreyenbroek, Philip G. and Stefan Sperl.  The Kurds  (New York: Routledge.  1992),  175. 
32  Ibid.,  175-176. 
33  Ciment, James.  The Kurds  (New York: Facts on File, Inc.  1996),  120. 
34  Kreyenbroek, Philip G. and Stefan Sperl.  The Kurds  (New York: Routledge.  1992),  174. 
35  Ciment, James.  The Kurds  (New York: Facts on File, Inc.  1996),  120. 
36  Nisan, Mordechai.  Minorities in the Middle East  (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc.  2002),  
40-41. 
37  Mohammad, Qazi.  “Qazi Mohammad’s will to the Kurdish People.”  Hajir  1 Nov. 2005.  1 Nov. 
2005  <http://hajirstony.blogspot.com/2005/01/qazi-mohammads-will-to-kurdish-people.html. > 
38  Kreyenbroek, Philip G. and Stefan Sperl.  The Kurds  (New York: Routledge.  1992),  177-178. 
39  Izady, Mehrdad.  The Kurds  (Bristol: Taylor & Francis, Inc.  1992),  65. 
40  Kreyenbroek, Philip G. and Stefan Sperl.  The Kurds  (New York: Routledge.  1992),  178. 
41  Ciment, James.  The Kurds  (New York: Facts on File, Inc.  1996),  65. 
42  Ibid.,  66. 
43  Ibid.,  67. 
44  Ibid.,  68-69. 
45  Ibid.,  70-71. 
46  Izady, Mehrdad.  The Kurds  (Bristol: Taylor & Francis, Inc.  1992),  210. 
47  Ibid.,  210. 
48  Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan.  “Brief Historical Background.”  Democratic Party of 
Iranian Kurdistan  1 Nov. 2005.  1 Nov. 2005  <http://www.pdk-iran.org/. > 
49  Izady, Mehrdad.  The Kurds  (Bristol: Taylor & Francis, Inc.  1992),  211. 
50  Komala.  “Komala and its Politics.”  Komala  1 Nov. 2005.  1 Nov. 2005  
<http://www.komala.org/english/sidor/a_eindex.htm. > 
51  Nisan, Mordechai.  Minorities in the Middle East  (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc.  2002),  
40. 
52  Izady, Mehrdad.  The Kurds  (Bristol: Taylor & Francis, Inc.  1992),  64. 
53  Campbell, Colm, Kirsten E. Schulze, and Martin Stokes.  Nationalism, Minorities and Diasporas: 
Identities and Right in the Middle East  (New York: Tauris Academic Studies,  1996),  83. 
54  Izady, Mehrdad.  The Kurds  (Bristol: Taylor & Francis, Inc.  1992),  64. 
55  Ibid.,  64. 
56  Nisan, Mordechai.  Minorities in the Middle East  (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc.  2002),  
40. 
57  Ibid.,  42. 
58  Izady, Mehrdad.  The Kurds  (Bristol: Taylor & Francis, Inc.  1992),  67. 
  
20
                                                                                                                                                 
59  Nisan, Mordechai.  Minorities in the Middle East  (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc.  2002),  
42. 
60  Ibid.,  43. 
61  Izady, Mehrdad.  The Kurds  (Bristol: Taylor & Francis, Inc.  1992),  68. 
62  Ibid.,  68. 
63  Ibid.,  69. 
64  Campbell, Colm, Kirsten E. Schulze, and Martin Stokes.  Nationalism, Minorities and Diasporas: 
Identities and Right in the Middle East  (New York: Tauris Academic Studies,  1996),  87-88. 
65  Ibid.,  92. 
66  Izady, Mehrdad.  The Kurds  (Bristol: Taylor & Francis, Inc.  1992),  70. 
67  Ibid.,  71. 
68  Nisan, Mordechai.  Minorities in the Middle East  (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc.  2002),  
51-52. 
69  Rosen, Nir.  “In the Balance.”  New York Times Magazine  February 20, 2005:  pp.  30. 
70  Ibid.,  50. 
71  Kurdistan Regional Government.  “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq.”  Kurdistan 
Regional Government  1 Nov. 2005.  1 Nov. 2005  <http://old.krg.org/reference/book-annotations.asp.> 
72  Kurdistan Regional Government.  “Final Draft Iraqi Constitution.”  Kurdistan Regional 
Government  1 Nov. 2005.  1 Nov. 2005  
<http://www.krg.org/articles/article_detail.asp?LangNr=12&RubricNr=107&ArticleNr=6668&LNNr=28&
RNNr=70.> 
73  Izady, Mehrdad.  The Kurds  (Bristol: Taylor & Francis, Inc.  1992),  213-214. 
74  Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.  “Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Homepage.”  Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan  1 Nov. 2005.  1 Nov. 2005  <http://www.puk.org/.> 
75  Izady, Mehrdad.  The Kurds  (Bristol: Taylor & Francis, Inc.  1992),  212-213. 
76  Kurdistan Democratic Party - Iraq.  “What Does KDP stand for?”  Kurdistan Democratic Party - 
Iraq  1 Nov. 2005.  1 Nov. 2005  <http://www.kdp.pp.se.> 
77  Barzani, Massoud.  “Barzani: We have no choice but Independent Kurdistan if civil war broke out 
in Iraq.”  Kurdistan Regional Government  18 Nov. 2005  
<http://www.krg.org/articles/article_detail.asp?ArticleNr=7560&LNNr=28&RNNr=70&LangNr=12.> 
78  Kurdistan Regional Government.  “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq.”  Kurdistan 
Regional Government  1 Nov. 2005.  1 Nov. 2005  <http://old.krg.org/reference/book-annotations.asp.> 





1.) Allison, Christine and Philip Kreyenbroek.  Kurdish Culture and Identity.  
Atlantic Highlands:  Zed Books Ltd,  1996. 
 
2.) Campbell, Colm, Kirsten E. Schulze, and Martin Stokes.  Nationalism, 
Minorities and Diasporas: Identities and Right in the Middle East.  
New York:  Tauris Academic Studies,  1996.  
 
3.) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  The Treaties of Peace 
1919-1923.  Vol. 2.  New York: Carnegie,  1924. 
 
4.) Ciment, James.  The Kurds.  New York: Facts on File, Inc,  1996. 
 
5.) Izady, Mehrdad R.  The Kurds.  Bristol:  Taylor & Francis Inc,  1992. 
 
6.) Kreyenbroek, Philip G. and Stefan Sperl.  The Kurds.  New York: 
Routledge,  1992. 
 
7.) Nisan, Mordechai.  Minorities in the Middle East.  2nd ed.  Jefferson: 
McFarland & Company, Inc,  2002. 
 
Periodicals: 
1.) Bram, Leon L.  “Turkey.”  Funk & Wagnalls New Encyclopedia.  New 
York City:  Funk & Wagnalls, Inc.  1975. 
 
2.) Rosen, Nir.  “In the Balance.”  New York Times Magazine  February 20, 
2005:  pp.  30. 
 
3.) Talabani, Jalal.  “Interview: Iraqi Kurdish Leader Jalal Talabani.”  Al-
Hayat.  Ibrahim Khayyat.  London, England.  9  Nov. 2003. 
 
Online Resources: 
1.) Barzani, Massoud.  “Barzani Interview: PKK-PUK Fighting, PLO, Iraq, 
Islamists.”  Al-Zaman.  Sa’d al-Bazzaz.  London,  England.  26  Oct.  
2000. 
 
2.) Barzani, Massoud.  “Barzani: We have no choice but Independent 
Kurdistan if civil war broke out in Iraq.”  Kurdistan Regional 






3.) Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan.  “Brief Historical Background.”  
Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan.  1 Nov. 2005 
< http://www.pdk-iran.org/.> 
 
4.) Komala.  “Komala and its Politics.”  Komala.  1 Nov. 2005 
 <http://www.komala.org/english/sidor/a_eindex.htm.> 
 
5.) Kurdistan Democratic Party – Iraq.  “What Does KDP stand for?”  
Kurdistan Democratic Party – Iraq.  1 Nov. 2005 
<http://www.kdp.pp.se.> 
 
6.) Kurdistan Regional Government.  “Final Draft Iraqi Constitution.”  




7.) Kurdistan Regional Government.  “Law of Administration for the State 




8.) Mohammad, Qazi.  “Qazi Mohammad’s will to the Kurdish People.”  




9.) Osman, Sipan.  “Kurdish Poems.”  Sipan’s Website.  1 Nov.  2005  
< http://sipan50.tripod.com/id5.html.> 
 
10.) Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.  “Patriotic of Kurdistan Homepage.”  
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.  1 Nov.  2005 
 < http://www.puk.org/.> 
